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GARY MONTGOMERY, ET AL.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the material facts in this case are not generally in dispute, Appellants point out to the Court that the
concern of the parties to this action has been with the
basic constitutionality of the Common Day of Rest Act
without regard to extensive investigation of its factual applications. Therefore, certain implications and assertations
in Respondents' brief should not be considered supported
by accepted factual bases. Thus, the statements in Re-
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spondents' brief on pages 9 and 10 that "almost every
item could be purchased on Sunday which could have
been purchased on that day prior to the effective date of
the Act," says nothing about the enforceability or application of the Act, since many persons in the State were
aware through wide publicity that the constitutionality of
the statue was being challenged and believed that adherence to the law was unnecessary until the constitutional
issue had been determined. Moreover, the inference in
Respondents' brief that only retail selling is affected by
the Act (Respondents' brief p. 25) is wholly without factual basis.
The facts and circumstances surrounding this appeal
(absence of testimony or even significant attention to the
factual context of the cases; absence of any written opinion or even verbal statement of a rationale for the decision
of the lower Court) make this in effect a declaratory
judgment action in which the presumptions favoring the
constitutionality of the Act and its factual application
should receive strong weight.
ARGUMENT
I

ACCURATE CONSTRUCTION OF PRIOR
CASE LAW SHOWS THAT THE ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAW
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH AND UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS.
The contention recurring throughout Respondents'
Argument I that Sunday closing laws are outside the scope
of the State's police power is irrelevant in view of the
finding in Broadbent v. Gibson, 140 P.2d 939 (Utah 1943)
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that "the constitutionality of general Sunday closing laws,
which have been enacted in nearly every State, is no longer
to be doubted. Such statutes have been uniformly upheld."
Whether a statute is an arbitrary or unreasonable exer;ise of the police power raises no question substantially
different from the question of unreasonable discrimination. The test for determining the existence of discrimination has been set forth in various ways throughout the
briefs of the parties; however, this test remains whether
the classifications contained in the statute are so obviously
arbitrary and without reason that no conceivable situation
of fact could be found to justify them. In this connection,
the extreme complexity of needs in Sunday closing legislation must be kept in mind, since the "degree of uniformity [which] reason demands of a statute is, of course, a
function of the complexity of the needs which the statute
seeks to accomodate." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 524 ( 1961). The application of this test to the subject statute cannot and must not be affected by vague
claims that it is no different from any other Sunday closing legislation or that the existence of exemptions destroys
the general purpose of the Act.
Appellants strongly disagree with Respondents' interpretation of the cases cited in their Argument I. For example, even though Respondents concede that the
ordinance involved in Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 194
P.2d 464 (Utah, 1948) was not a general Sunday closing
law, they fail to recognize the importance of that fact in
evaluating the holding of the Gronlund court, as explained
on pages 15 and 16 of the brief of Appellants Gary Montgomery et al. The quotation from Gronlund on page 1617 of Respondents' brief is misleading in its implication
that any commodity exemptions would be unreasonably
discriminatory because large stores may not find it eco-
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nomically feasible to sell the exempted items. That interpretation would require a complete repudiation of the
analysis so carefully set forth in Broadbent u. Gibson,
supra. The Gronlund court in this portion of its opinion
was speaking to the discriminatory effect of not providing
for general closing. Thus, its language went to the question
whether certain businesses were forced to close by being
prohibited under the subject ordinance from selling "any
commodities" but the exempted ones. The court thereby
concluded that the effect of the ordinance was to prohibit
retail selling generally and its concern was with the failure of the ordinance not also to prohibit the general performance of labor. Obviously, the constitutional prohibition of both retail selling and labor would be subject to
certain exemptions, a fact recognized by the court elsewhere in its opinion.
Respondents' interpretation of the Nebraska Supreme
Court's opinion in Skag-way Department Stores, Inc. v.
City of Omaha, 140 N.W. 2.d 28 (Nebr., 1966) is similarly faulty, even to the extent of being seriously misleading.
First, the court was not, as stated by Respondents, considering a general Sunday closing law. The two ordinances
involved in that case prohibited the sale on Sunday of
clothing, hardware and food. Both ordinances provided
for the closing of stores who sell these items as their "primary business." The Nebraska Court found that the classification of stores in relation to their names or their
"primary business" is not practical in the day of the department store and the supermarket. The Court was concerned that a clothing store may be forced to close under
the ordinances but a competitor may be open to sell
clothing, so long as the sale of clothing was not his main
business. Furthermore, the "economic changes" argument
derived from Respondents' quotation from this case has
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no bearing on the statute at issue in this appeal. The Nebraska ordinances in that case clearly had the effect of
closing some stores that sold clothing, hardware and food
while permitting other stores to stay open and sell the
same items, with no attempt to relate this disinction to
recreational or other purposes of the Nebraska ordinances.
These ordinances were therefore of a similar character to
those found unconstitutional in Broadbent v. Gibson,
which dealt with business exemptions rather than commodity exemptions. The chief concern of the Nebraska
Court was that so few stores were affected by the closing
ordinances while persons involved in manufacturing, services, professions, and agricultural pursuits were all excluded. That problem simply does not exist with the
statute before this Court.
Respondents have been unable to refute Appellants'
contention that no recent State Sunday closing case has
found the statute or ordinance involved unconstitutionally
discriminatory except in cases dealing with non-general
closing provisions. Respondents have attempted to overcome that deficiency in their case by arguing that the
Common Day of Rest Act affects "almost entirely" retail
selling only. Certain large employers are exempt from the
operation of the Act because, in the language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "the cost of stopping and restarting them
is simply too great, or because to be without their services
would be more disruptive of peace than to have them
continue." McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 524. However, most manufacturers, the professions, services, wholesale businesses, agricultural pursuits and other forms of
labor are all within the proscription of the Act. The ordinances and statutes in the cases cited by Respondents
did not even approach the breadth of this coverage, either
in their language or in their effect.
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Respondents would infer unreasonable discrimination
from the existence of some exemptions that are not expressly commodity exemptions. Those exemptions are
eluded in the statute expressly because they relate to
non- mercantile activities. If the statute is to be a general
closing law and if it is to provide exemptions for "works
of charity and necessity," as required by the Broadbent
and Gronlund cases, there will necessarily be exemptions
that cannot be defined as "commodities," such as services
and institutions that must continue. The only question in
observing the existence of such exemptions is whether they
discriminate between persons or businesses similarly situated. No such discrimination exists, in that all transportation facilities, for example, are exempted.
Respondents have misinterpreted the Act on pages
19 and 20 of their brief by claiming that only service stations and recreational facilities may sell the goods or provide the services that are customarily provided by or incidental to the operation of such facilities. The language of
the Act may easily be interpreted to provide that anyone
may sell such commodities or render such services. Appellants do not contend that the exemptions "incidental to
the operation of" certain facilities would permit a clothing
store or a machine shop to operate in a railroad yard or
golf course, since such operations are obviously not incidental or necessary to the operation of the exempted facility, whose exemption is clearly tied to the purposes of the
legislation. If certain retail outlets were to find it economically impractical to remain open in order to sell the
commodities provided by such exempted facilities as service stations and resorts, that merely demonstrates that
such stores are not similarly situated. The fact remains
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that the law permits them to open and sell the exempted
commodities if they wish.
Appellants have cited in their prior briefs cases representing the majority view that a Saturday option does
not affect the constitutionality of a Sunday closing law.
The purpose of the Saturday option is to avoid discrimination against "Sabbatarians." For this reason, the statute
requires that any person making the Saturday election
must be consistent in that election. This avoids the possibility that some business owners would take advantage of
the Saturday option by closing some outlets on Saturday
in order to open them on Sunday. This limitation in the
Act is designed simply to restrict the Saturday option to
its intended purpose.
Respondents express concern that the enforcement
provisions of the Act may not result in uniform or fair
enforcement because any person or any County Attorney
may bring an action to en join an alleged violation of the
Act. In reality, this aspect of the Act promotes greater fairness and consistency in enforcement. Any party who feels
that he is discriminated against by the selective enforcement of a County Attorney, which is the kind of enforcement customarily experienced even if a statute made enforcement mandatory, has an opportunity under this Act
to bring an action for enforcement himself. Were enforcement left solely in the hands of the County Attorney, the
discrimination in enforcement argument would have more
impact because such enforcement would likely be selective
regardless of statutory language. With respect to enforcement, Appellants further point out that nothing in the
statute authorizes a party to bring an action for damages.
That Appellant Skaggs Drug Centers sought damages in
its action is irrelevant, since the propriety of that claim
has not been ruled on in these cases.
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Now with respect to the Sunday closing cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, Appellants
cannot recommend too strongly that the Court read carefully the exhaustive analysis in these cases. Respondents
would have the Court believe that the subject of Sunday
closing was treated only lightly by the Supreme Court,
when in fact the opinions and appendix in the McGowan
case show that no stone was left unturned in evaluating
the entire history, purpose, and application of Sunday
closing legislation, not only in this country but in Europe
as well. In spite of Respondents' vague assertions that the
equal protection tests of the Federal and State constitutions could conceivably achieve differing results, absolutely
no authority is given to support the application of a different test. In view of the almost routine consideration
given to claims of discrimination in constitutional arguments, it would seem that some difference would have
been expressed between these tests if one had ever had any
meaning. The United States Supreme Court has clearly
turned its full attention and resources to its examination
of the exact kinds of constitutional arguments involved in
this action. The unequivocal authority of those cases cannot easily be circumvented.
Appellants respectfully and earnestly submit that
the available legal authorities overwhelmingly support
their claim that this Act is not unreasonably discriminatory in any material respect.

II
THE MEANING OF THE ACT IS ASCERTAINABLE, BY REFERENCE TO ITS PURPOSE AND ITS
STANDARDS.
Respondents concede on the one hand that criminal
statutes are subject to a more stringent test than civil
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statutes. On the other hand, they claim (Brief, page 28)
that there is no difference in the test to be applied. Of
course the test is different, the reasons for this difference
relating to the difference in impact upon an individual
between a violation of a criminal statute and a violation
of a civil statute. In the case of a civil statute, the test
is whether the legislative intent is unascertainable. See
these Appellants' Brief, p. 25. The first section of the
Act is unusually helpful in providing an explanation of
the legislature's intent. Based upon this statement of intent and upon the examples given to define the terms of
the exemptions in the statute, reasonable standards exist
by which the legislative meaning may be determined. In
order to ascertain that meaning, it is not necessary for
the Court to find that each word is self-explanatory. Any
student of the law knows that the imprecision of human
language is one of the unavoidable facts of life. However,
that statutes may need interpretation, whether by an Attorney General, a Court opinion or otherwise, does not
establish per se vagueness.
The phrases of the subject Act selected for discussion
by Respondents may require this Court to interpret the
statute. But the phrases are susceptible of interpretation
and the legislative intent can in fact be ascertained. For
example, section 5 ( 1) of the Act referring to goods or
services necessary to the maintenance of health, safety or
life is much more specific than the exemption for "works
of necessity" which the Court in Broadbent v. Gibson was
even willing to imply since it viewed such an exemption
as constitutionally necessary. The examples given in this
section help to define the class exempted because each
example is of a category which, were it not available in
an emergency, could result in a loss of life or serious in-
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jury to health. While "food" may be generally necessary
for the maintenance of health, it would not typically spell
the difference between life and death if unavailable on
one day only. In that sense, food differs from medical services and prescription medicine. The Utah Supreme
Court apparently had no difficulty with that distinction
in the Broadbent case in categorizing "items necessary to
the maintenance of life and health" as "works of necessity"
which must be exempted from any valid Sunday closing
statute. 140 P.2d 939, 945-46.
The phrases challenged by Respondents on pages 32
through 34 of their brief are likewise susceptible of interpretation in light of the purpose of the Act and the
examples given in the exemption provisions of the statute.
The Court is not only free to interpret but even has a duty
to interpret these phrases in a manner that would render
the statute constitutional. Phrases such as "customarily
provided by" and "incidental to the operation of," which
seem especially troublesome to Respondents, have been
expressly recognized as not violating constitutional due
process vagueness standards by the United States Supreme
Court. See the brief of Appellants Gary Montgomery et
al at pages 26-27. The phrase "confections" was contained
in the statute at issue in Broadbent v. Gibson. That phrase
not only failed to trouble the Broadbent Court, but was
in fact used by the Court freely in its opinion without the
Court's feeling any need to define the term.
Point II of Respondents' brief alleges in its title that
the Act does not contain adequate standards for interpretation, and yet no evidence or argument is given to refute
Appellants' contention that the standards are contained
in the legislative intent and the examples so clearly set
forth throughout the statute.
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The Court is reminded that the irtjunctive remedy
contained in the subject Act removes the constitutional
objection of ambiguous criminal statutes because the injunction will provide a clear warning to any violator before contempt penalties may be invoked.
Sunday closing statutes have traditionally contained
exemptions for "works of charity and necessity," which
have never rendered those statutes unworkable over periods of many decades. To define classes by legislative intent
and specific examples is in fact a desirable alternative to
using only the general category of necessity and charity.
The only other alternative, as recognized by Respondents,
would be that of setting forth infinite lists of commodities
and services, all of which would still require interpretation
and which may be inherently unfair if other commodities
or services of the same class were not expressly included. If
the Court truly accepts the proposition that general Sunday closing laws whose exemptions relate to the accepted
purposes of such legislation may be constitutional, the
statutory scheme adopted by the Utah legislature must be
recognized as containing an optimum balance between
discrimination and definitional classification.

III
THE ACT CONSTITUTIONALLY AVOIDS RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE FREE EXERCISE OF
RELIGION BUT DOES NOT ESTABLISH ANY RELIGION.
Respondents seem to claim that the Saturday option
provision of the Act suggests some hidden religious motive
behind the passage of the statute. The reason for the Saturday option is set forth in the Appellants' brief on page
11. The adoption of Respondents' reasoning, if applied to
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the case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, (1963),
would yield the conclusion that State unemployment laws
have a religious motivation if they permit the payment of
unemployment compensation to persons who cannot obtain a job because they refuse to work on Saturday out of
religious convictions. The absurdity of such a conclusion
is obvious.
This Court has already recognized that although
Sunday closing statutes "had their origin in religious observance of the Sabbath, they are not now to be so regarded." Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, at 943.
IV
BY CONTAINING REASONABLE CLASSIFICATIONS RELATED TO ITS PURPOSE, THE ACT
ACCOMPLISHES ITS PURPOSE AS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER AND WITHOUT
CONSTITUTING SPECIAL LEGISLATION.
Respondents infer in their Point IV that some
.mysterious additional discrimination tests beyond the basic
theory of reasonable classification and reasonable discrimination should be applied to the subject statute. However, the test remains whether the legislature had any
rational basis for its classifications and discriminations
which relate to the purpose of the Act. This inference imposes no requirement upon this Court beyond an application of the tests for reasonableness of classification established by prior case law in this State, other states and the
United States Supreme Court with respect to Sunday
closing legislation.
The cases upon which Respondents so heavily rely
for their arguments regarding arbitrariness or unreasonable classification did not deal with general Sunday clos-
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ing laws. These cases, as well as this Court's recent
decision of Dodge Town, Inc. v. Romney et al. ____________ P.
2d -------------------- (Utah, 1971), all dealt with statutes or
ordinances that affected retail selling only. The discrimination in all of these statutes against retailers as compared
with other businesses and professions is obvious. The same
kind of obvious discrimination exists in all of the other
State cases upon which Respondents rely. The Common
Day of Rest Act, by contrast, provides for a general cessation of all work and labor throughout the State. Some
exemptions to this general cessation are necessary in order
to achieve the purposes of the law set forth in section I.
Whether those exemptions relate in any rational way to
the purpose of the Act is the only question before the
Court on the subject of discrimination, classification, or
arbitrariness. It is submitted that the legislature is acting
clearly within its constitutional rights and duties in determining that certain commodities or services must be
available to promote diversion, recreation or relaxation,
and that certain functions of the community must go on,
either because they are necessary for stability and good
order or because the cost of stopping and restarting them
is too great. It is precisely these kinds of legislative determinations which this Court had in mind in stating "the
Legislature has a wide discretion in determining what
should come within the class of permitted activities and
what shall be excluded." Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, at
944.
Legislative determinations for the purpose of classification within the framework of a truly general Sunday
closing law are matters entirely different from the legislative determination to close only a certain narrow segment of community business, such as was the case in Dodge
Town, Inc. v. Romney, supra. It may be argued that the
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classifications within the framework of a general closing
law and the classification of a certain class such as car
dealers are different only as a matter of degree. However,
the extent of that difference in degree is extremely significant and, as pointed out by Justice Holmes, "questions of
degree are the only ones worth arguing about in the law."
Discrimination and classification necessarily exist in
all legislation. Thus, to show distinctions and exemptions
is not to show unconstitutionality. Appellants submit that
the legislature took unusual care in setting forth its purposes and in tying its classifications to those purposes in
the Common Day of Rest Act.

v
SO LONG AS IT ACTS REASONABLY, THE
LEGISLATURE HAS AUTHORITY TO DECLARE
WHAT SHALL BE DEEMED NUISANCES.
Respondents have again inferred in their Point V that
there is some additional mysterious test to be applied in
determining whether the legislature has acted arbitrarily.
However, "in general, the legislature may declare anything to be a nuisance which is detrimental to the health,
morals, peace or welfare of the citizens of the State. It may
also enlarge the category of nuisances by declaring acts or
things to be nuisances which were not such at common
law," 39 Am. fur., Nuisances§ 12, so long as the legislature
does not act capriciously or arbitrarily. In determining
such arbitrariness, no new tests are applicable beyond
those already discussed with respect to reasonable classification. The legislature's basic authority under the police
power with respect to Sunday closing has been unquestionably established. See the brief of these Appellants at page
13. Furthermore, Respondents have already conceded
elsewhere in their brief that "the sale of goods on Sunday
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constituted an offense under the common law." State v.
Hill, 369 P.2d 365 (Kansas, 1962), quoted in
dents' brief at page 27. That the legislature used the word
"nuisance" in this Act adds or detracts in no material way
from the intent, scope, penalties, or reasonableness of the
Common Day of Rest Act.

VI
THE COMMON DAY OF REST ACT HAS
ONLY ONE SUBJECT, CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN
ITS TITLE.
The title of the subject statute clearly provides "for
exemptions from such prohibition," and cannot be expected to contain all of the exceptions in the title. As has
been stated earlier by this Court, "the title does not have
to be an index to the Act. All that is required is that the
subject matter of the Act be reasonably related to the title
and that all parts of the Act be reasonably related to each
other." State v. Twitchell, 333 P.2d 1075, 1078 (Utah,
1959). The one-subject rule was designed to allow legislators to rely on the titles of acts and to inform the public
of the general nature of legislation, since, at the time the
Utah constitution was adopted in 1896, bills were not published in written form nor were they generally available
to the public. The exemptions and content of the Common Day of Rest Act were not only printed, they were also
the subjects of vigorous discussion in local newspapers
prior to adoption of the Act and were even the subject of
a public hearing. Appellants must agree in response to this
contention by Respondents that "even when the [onesubject] rule is invoked by counsel, its allegation is ordinarily considered little more than evidence of a weak case."
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Note, Utah's Legislative Branch, 1966 Utah Law Review,
416, 450.
CONCLUSION
Respondents' brief has submitted no legal authority
to justify a finding that the Common Day of Rest Act is
unconstitutional either in its entirety or in any respect.
The judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRUCE C. HAFEN
STRONG, POLEMAN & FOX
315 East 2nd South, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah &H 11
Attorneys for Gary Montgomery, et al.

